Problems of Contractors and Their Carriers by Vogel, Mart R
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 2 Article 1 
1968 
Problems of Contractors and Their Carriers 
Mart R. Vogel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vogel, Mart R. (1968) "Problems of Contractors and Their Carriers," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 44 : 
No. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol44/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
PROBLEMS OF CONTRACTORS AND
THEIR CARRIERS*
MART R. VOGEL*
Following the close of World War II, a tremendous building
and construction boom occurred in this country, and it is still
continuing. One of the results has been a turnover of some long
cherished notions of what the law is when related to property
owners, builders, and their insurance carriers. This paper will at-
tempt to outline and explain some of the problems now plaguing
large industries and the general public, the effect of which is to
increase construction costs substantially.
Once it could be said with conviction that one who hired an
independent contractor to perform a job, retaining no control over
the details of the work, was not liable for the negligent acts of
his independent contractor. This was said to be the general rule.
Today this is no longer the general rule. In fact there are now so
many judge-made exceptions that the rule is a kind of scarecrow
shot so full of holes as to be scarcely visible.
Obviously, if an owner employs someone to do a job but is
himself negligent, he can be held responsible for the resulting
injuries. Likewise, if the owner furnishes the tools to do the work
and an accident occurs because of some defect in them, the dam-
aged person may look to him for redress. Or if he retains con-
trol over the progress of the work, this, because the retention
invades the independence of his employee, may make the owner
liable simply because of his obligation to see to it that harm does
not result from the execution of his wishes.1 Further, he must
not employ an incompetent to do the work. In these cases, then,
the owner must take care to have the job progress safely and upon
its completion to inspect and make reasonably certain that it will
not harm others. The law has made him responsible for his own
negligence.
* Adapted from a lecture delivered to the Twin Cities Claims Managers Council in
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
So Wattam, Vogel, Vogel, Bright & Peterson, Fargo, North Dakota, LL.B. 1938, Uni-
versity of North Dakota and George Washington University.
1. Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.2d 677 (1965).
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Over the years, however, the law, sometimes by statute but
more often by judicial fiat, has gone far further, and in the con-
tracting field each lives with the doctrine of liability without fault.
The owner may no longer leave full responsibility for the work
with his independent contractor and "sleep easy." If an injury
results from some neglect of the contractor, he may be held ab-
solutely liable though he were a thousand miles away, though he
may have selected the most competent contractor in the business
leaving to him all of the details of the work and retaining no
control whatsoever.
What is the reason for the development of something which
superficially seems so contrary to common sense and fair play?
Some courts have justified refusing to permit the owner to rely
upon another by basing their decision upon "public policy" rather
than any established rules of law. They say he may not shift
his responsibility if the risk is a great one because the community
must be protected and what is or is not great is usually a fact
issue for determination by the jury. There is something quite in-
consistent in the requirement, for example, in an automobile case,
that negligence of the owner or agency between him and the driver
must be shown, when in a building project such a showing is not
essential. The difference lies, we are told, in that the activity
of the one may be "inherently dangerous." Some call it "intrinsic
danger" or work which is "ultrahazardous." It probably started
with dynamite cases since the result of blasting was unpredictable,
the use of vicious animals, electricity and fire. These, it was
though, demanded extraordinary precautions and the owner should
not be permitted to transfer to others, such as the independent con-
tractor, the burden of making the work safe.2
It is not difficult to accept the fact that when an employee
blows up a wall or a structure which lies adjacent to the side-
walk used by pedestrians, someone may get hurt unless ample
safety measures are taken. The employer is held under a duty
to recognize the high degree of risk as related to the premises
and circumstances prevailing and to see to it that adequate meas-
ures are taken to eliminate the danger. His liability is predicated,
not upon the negligence of his contractor, but upon the danger
inhering in the performance of the work resulting directly from it.
North Dakota has distinguished between injuries resulting from
or inherent in the work itself and a careless act relating to some
collateral matter. In a case involving an unguarded telephone post
2. W. PROOSM. TORTS, § 860 (ard ed. 1964).
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hole into which the plaintiff's three year old child fell, the court
said:
[A] distinction is made, indeed, between a con-
tract whereby the independent contractor is required to dig
a deep pit or well, and a third person is injured by falling
into that well, and a case where a contractor is authorized
to build a house, which in itself is not dangerous, but while
building it he drops a plank upon the head of a passer-by.
In one case the injury is occasioned by the subject of the
contract itself, or the thing constructed under the contract.
In the other it is occasioned by an act collateral to the
construction . . . (Emphasis supplied.),'
The three North Dakota cases referring to this question4 all
relate to claims of third persons and not to employees working
on the project itself. Of the older cases in which inherently dan-
gerous activity was found, many had to do with hazards to a
public thoroughfare; and the test of what should be considered
inherently dangerous was based upon the danger inhering in the
performance of the work resulting directly from it and not from
the collateral negligence of the contractor or independent con-
tractor.
5
More recently, the doctrine of liability without fault has been
extended to plain, ordinary construction work and those included
as beneficiaries are not only members of the public but workmen
on the job itself. For example, if a property owner plans on put-
ting up a building and hires the most competent contractor in the
business, he still may not be relieved of liability if an accident
results and someone is injured even though the person is a work-
man employed by a subcontractor. Or perhaps a general con-
tractor, because of one thing or another cannot do the project him-
self employs someone else who is competent, reliable, but unfortu-
nately, not as financially responsible as thought. The inevitable oc-
curs: the accident happens, suit is brought, and the expert testifies
over strenuous objections that "this work is inherently dangerous
because it involves heights and it is well known that objects are
dropped and people fall from ladders." Because of that simple
statement an issue of fact arises for the jury to determine which
justifies a holding against either the property owner or the general
contractor, notwithstanding a complete lack of control over the de-
tails of the work.6
3. Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tel. Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 793, 796 (1912).
4. Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950); Taute V.
J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 25 N.D. 102, 141 N.W. 134 (1913) ; Ruehl v. Lidgerwood
Rural Tel. Co, supra note 3.
5. Reilly v. Highman. 345 P.2d 652 (Kan. 1959).
6. Schultz & Lindsay Co str. Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1965).
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Thus the owner will want to protect himself from the acts of
the contractor or if he is the contractor, from the acts of his
subcontractor. This may be done through the drafting and execu-
tion of a contract of indemnity, sometimes referred to as a "hold-
harmless agreement." Its purpose of course is to indemnify against
the negligent acts of the one performing the work, and this was
thought important, even essential, in those instances where the
"inherent danger doctrine" is applicable. Although in the absence
of such an agreement, the owner might have a common law right
of indemnification for the negligence of the employee, this does
not follow where the injury results from the nature of the work
itself and not the collateral acts of his performing it.
The property owner may then be furnished with an agreement
which provides that the independent contractor must save him
harmless from loss, cost or expense because of any failure to
carry out faithfully the provisions of the contract, including the
provision which requires him to do the job in such a way as to
avoid injury or damage to persons or property and which makes
him responsible directly to those damaged. The agreement may
take many forms. One commonly in use among contractors in-
cludes specific provisions requiring the indemnitor to obtain "public
liability insurance" protecting the contractor or subcontractor
against claims for bodily injury, death or damage to property.
While compliance with such a provision will give the needed pro-
tection to the independent contractor, it does not mean that the
insurer will honor the hold-harmless provision of the contract.
The contractor can protect himself by purchasing contractual
liability insurance to team up with his general or comprehensive
policy. Too often he does not. He then finds himself in the
position of locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen.
In some respects the oversight is morally, although not legally,
excusable. After all, the contractor looks at his general liability
insurance policy and finds the provision:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury, sicless or disease, including death at any
time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person caused
by accident.
And he thinks: "This should do it; if I am at fault, my insurance
will take care of everything. I have complied with the contract."
But has he complied? Probably if he had checked the exclusions
in the policy, assuming it is a standard form, he would have seen
the one which provides that there is no coverage for liability as-
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sumed by the insured under any contract or agreement except a
contract as defined therein. The contract "defined therein" is
limited to a lease of premises, an easement, an agreement re-
quired by ordinance, a sidetrack, elevator or escalator agreement.
There is no mention of a "hold-harmless agreement" or a con-
tract of indemnity. Once the accident has happened, where does
this leave the parties, the owner and contractor?
Perhaps the property owner felt secure in the knowledge that
he not only selected a competent, reliable and independent con-
tractor but one who guaranteed to hold him harmless from all
loss and expense, and backed this up with a policy of liability
insurance reciting adequate limits. Then he finds that the agree-
ment is of no real consequence because the contractor did not
purchase contractual liability insurance. Unfortunately, he himself
may not be financially able to dole out the protection the owner
thought he had. The most complete hold-harmless contract is only
as good as the ability of the indemnitor to perform. This ability
is most often dependent upon whether or not his promises are
backed up by adequate contractual liability insurance.
Shifting the risk through a hold-harmless agreement and the
purchase of some form of contractual liability insurance may not,
however, be the complete answer to a problem which is so com-
plex and difficult to solve. There are limitations which may make
the agreement impractical or even inadvisable. The first of them
is the element of cost. The construction business is intensely com-
petitive. If the contractor is to be tied up with elaborate require-
ments of indemnity, even going so far as to require him to save
his employer harmless from the employer's own negligence, the
result may be to price the employer right out of the market.
Presumably the insurer is going to scrutinize carefully any in-
demnity contract and this is going to be reflected in the premium
charged. The contractor might decide that he wants no part of a
bargain which is going to shave his profit margin or be so tied
up with his indemnifying the insurance company so as to make it
impossible for him to continue the business. There is also the
problem of the insurer: is it willing to write contractual liability,
something highly specalized, over and above its standard general
liability protection? In fact, some years ago the American In-
stitute of Architects, in commenting on the "hold-harmless pro-
vision," produced this cautionary statement:7
Architects should remember that such policies (Contrac-
tor's liability insurance) protect the contractor from liabil-
7. T= A.I.A. STLNDARD CONTACT FORMS AND TEM LAW.
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ities imposed by law. They specifically do not protect him
against liabilities voluntarily assumed under a contract,
known as 'contract liabilities'. The typical example of such
a contract liability was the 'hold harmless' clause so familiar
in the past and still found not infrequently in construction
contracts. By such a clause the Contractor agreed to hold
the owner harmless from any and all causes resulting
from the Contract. This type of clause was eliminated from
the Standard Documents. Architects should be careful not
to include any such clause in their additional General Con-
ditions. A claim under such a clause would not be recog-
nized by the insurance company, in the absence of a specific
provision for such coverage.
Probably the action taken by the A.I.A. is a reflection of the
problems, especially the cost of indemnity. In any event, certain
conclusions can be drawn:
1. The owner should obtain his own protection through in-
surance coverage written by a company for him and broad
enough to cover not only his own acts but those of others
for whom he may become vicariously liable.
2. Despite its drawbacks the hold-harmless agreement is be-
coming increasingly utilized and this use necessitates care-
ful draftsmanship to be certain that it represents the real
intentions of the parties.
3. The advise of a lawyer and an insurance agent should be
sought and received to the end that adequate contractual
liability insurance is procured and maintained to support
the contract of indemnity.
For a long time the tendency of the courts has been to ex-
tend the coverage provided by an insurance contract through pin-
pointing some phrase and proclaiming that due to ambiguity the
insurer must bear the burden.
Notably, a manufacturer and contractor's general liability pol-
icy provides for the coverage for premise operations and also,
given a premium of course, for completed operations. The con-
tractor normally purchases protection for only his premises and
operations. Certainly this covers a wide field. After all, he usually
does not manufacture anything and sells only his services or, at
most, his materials and services. Therefore, he does not buy
coverage for his products, as does the manufacturer; and the
phrase Products-Completed Operations is confusing to one not
schooled in the intricacies of insurance. Thus the contractor has
insurance to protect against what he is doing at the time he does
206
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it. Confident in this protection, he proceeds with the work,
finishes it and leaves. After completion of the operation the in-
evitable accident occurs. Somewhere along the line a workman
commits a negligent act resulting in an injury.
The contractor reports the accident to his insurer who replies:
"Sorry, but your policy for which we charged a premium
of thirty dollars, protects you only when the operation is
in progress. That is what the policy says: 'Division 1.
Premises-Operations. The ownership, maintenance or use of
of the premises, and all operations during the policy period
which are necessary or incidental thereto.' If you had wished
to be protected after completing the job, then you should
have obtained the additional coverage which is identified as
'Division 4. Products-Completed Operations . . . goods or
products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the
named insured . . . if the accident occurs after possession
of the goods or products has been relinquished to others ...
and if such accident occurs away from premises owned,
rented or controlled by the named insured . -. . ; (2) op-
erations, if the accident occurs after such operations have
been completed or abandoned and occurs away from the
premises owned, rented or controlled by the named in-
sured . . .' "
These are words with which those in the insurance business
have lived for many years and until modern times, specifically
the last five or ten years, there was not much question. If the
contractor had an accident while operating, he was covered. If it
occurred long after the work was completed, because he may not
have properly tightened some joint in a gas pipe, there was no
protection. It was almost as simple as that.
Moreover there then developed the probelm of ambiguity, a
cure-all which has exploded what was previously thought to be a
well established principle, to wit: if the accident occurred after
completion of the operations, the contractor was not protected un-
less he purchased and paid for "completed operations" coverage.
However, in New Jersey, not much more than ten years ago,
one court8 took a dim view of a liability policy purchased by a
contractor. An injury occurred after a dirt excavator had com-
pleted a job in which he failed to fill a low spot or otherwise raise
some guard to protect the unwary. The court found that the di-
vision applicable to products or completed operations was so am-
biguous that a person of ordinary understanding could not be ex-
pected to understand its implications. It said that the normal
S. MoAllister v. Century Indemnity Co. of Hartford, 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d 845
(1958).
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individual would naturally expect his policy to cover all operations,
and that this should be broad enough to include liability arising
from those operations-whether or not the accident occurred before
or after its completion.
This decision loosened the dam; in the years following, court
after court held that the products-completed operations coverage
provision did not bar recovery under premises-operations. One
writer referred to this reversal as a "judicial revolution;" but
whether or not one calls it a "revolution," it is a fact in the in-
surance business.
With the trend of adverse decisions on this matter of com-
pleted operations coverage, one could:
1. Reappraise old positions and interpretations of coverage
with a view of educating the prospective purchaser in ob-
taining the maximum protection he needs;
2. Revise and rework the policy provisions thus meeting the
objections which judges throughout the country have raised;
3. Separate the so-called manufacturer and contractor's liabil-
ity policy. (How many manufacturers are contractors and
vice versa?).
4. Divide the products and completed operations coverage.
(After all, there is little connection between them; and good
draftsmanship would indicate that the simplicity attained
would be well worth the additional cost.)
A discussion of indemnity as it affects contractors, whether
the indemnity is expressed or implied, probably would not be com-
plete without some reference to a case which eventually reached
the United States Supreme Court.9 There the shipowner entered
into an agreement with the cargo loader to load the cargo. An
employee of the cargo loader was hurt and his employer's com-
pensation insurance carrier paid out compensation and medical
costs to the employee. Thereafter the injured man brought suit,
which-under the Longshoremen's Compensation Act-he could do,
against the shipowner. He recovered a judgment on the ground
that his injuries were due to the shipowner's negligence. The ship-
owner then filed a third party complaint against the employer claim-
ing an implied agreement by the employer, the cargo loader, to
hold the shipowner harmless. The Compensation Act had the usual
provisions that the "liability of an employer [for compensation
under the Act] shall be exclusive and in place of all other Ii-
9. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan AtL S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1966).
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ability of such employer to the employee . . . and anyone other-
wise entitled to recover damages from such employer . . . on
account of the injury or death." 10 The Court held that the employer
who paid the compensation was liable despite the exclusiveness of
the compensation act.
The effect of this decision and many to follow makes the
employer, in a sense, liable twice: once for the compensation pay-
ments to his employee directly or through an insurance carrier
and again to the one responsible for those injuries whom he may
have, by implication or otherwise, agreed to indemnify.
Various legislatures, while imposing absolute liability on em-
ployers under workmen's compensation to the extent of the benefits
set forth, also appear to give employers certain counterbalancing
advantages. Since their liability was to have been confined to the
benefits provided under the acts, they had every reason to be-
lieve that, having purchased compensation insurance, they need have
no further concern. As pointed out by the minority in the Ryan1
decision:
But the end result here is that this employer is actually
mulcted in damages ($75,000 in fact) because its employee
successfully prosecuted a third-party action. Liability is
thus imposed because of the negligence of the employer's
other employees. This the Act forbids. Whether called 'com-
mon-law indemnity,' 'contribution,' 'subrogation,' or any
other name, the result is precisely the same. The employer
has to pay more 'on account of' an injury to his employee
than Congress said he should.
Hence, the decisions permitting recovery on the strength of an
implied indemnity complicate the whole picture of compensation.
They deprive the employer of his limited liability and discourage
subrogation attempts against the wrongdoer. They are even dis-
advantageous to the employee in those states where the employer
controls the litigation because most employers will think twice be-
fore agreeing to finance a suit against themselves.
The breaking of a traditional legal pattern with the adoption
of liability based upon implied indemnity has also thrown a good
deal of doubt into our negligence law (the theories of active
or passive, primary or secondary negligence) and this in turn
has created doubt and uncertainty respecting the rights and ob-
ligations of those involved. The development is especially import-
ant for contractors because of their association with the public,
subcontractors and the like. Contractual indemnity may now be
10. Id. at 128-29.
11. 8upro note 9.
209
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
implied, despite the absence of an agreement, merely from the
relationship between or among them. Liability may be found re-
gardless of negligence or contributory negligence on the part of the
one claiming the indemnity.
One case especially contributed to the existing confusion. 12
General Electric shipped a load of its products with a trucking
company under a simple transportation agreement. The goods were
packed by General Electric in a trailer and then turned over to
the trucker for delivery to the destination. The load shifted due
to the negligence of General Electric in packing and the truck
company's driver was injured. The driver collected workmen's
compensation from his employer, then sued General Electric who
in turn impleaded the employer, claiming indemnity. The driver
recovered, of course, against General Electric; and that, one would
think, should have been the end of the case. This did not occur,
however. The court went on to hold the employer liable to the
negligent shipper, General Electric, because of the transportation
contract and some regulations of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. This appears to have been the holding notwithstanding
the lack of any indemnity provision, in the contract and no intent
whatsoever on the part of the trucker to guarantee General
Electric against its own negligence.
Nonetheless, the employer may be face to face with the pos-
sibility that his court has held or will hold to the new pattern
by placing this added burden on him and force him to indemnify
the 'negligent actor who injures his employee. In that event, what
might be done.
1. When the accident occurs, those concerned and their counsel
must recognize that the matter of contracts, written, oral or
implied, may be involved and all of the facts must be obtain-
ed.
2. There are some courts which will still recognize only express
contracts of indemnity or at least will look to the evidence
to negative indemnification. Consequently it is important to
get the parties early committed in writing respecting their
understanding and intentions.
3. The lawyer can be less quick in concluding that no liability
exists and thus possibly mislead his employers in the absence
of a meticulous examination of the applicable law.
4. Interested parties can promote new or clarifying legislation,
particularly in some of the instances discussed where in-
justice is manifest.
12. General Meo. Co. v. Morets, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cr. 1959).
